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OBTAINING THE GIFT TAX EXCLUSION ON GIFTS IN
TRUST: DRAFTING AND LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTIONS
Zolman Cavitch*

o prospect is more appealing to the modern taxpayer than the
possibility of getting something for nothing. Of the few such
remaining possibilities, one of the most attractive is the federal gift tax
annual exclusion.1 Indeed, by taking full advantage of the $3,000
($6,000 for married donors) 2 exclusion for annual gifts to each of
several donees, a donor might succeed in transferring several hundred
thousand dollars-thus effecting both estate and income tax savingswithout any gift tax cost. Unfortunately, however, this apparent free
ride is not so readily available when the donor makes his gifts by means
of the inter vivos trust.
Although recent developments in the field of federal gift taxation
have increased the attractiveness of making lifetime gifts, they have
also highlighted the extremely technical pitfalls which face the donor
who contemplates obtaining annual gift tax exclusions on gifts made in
trust. These divergent developments have produced an unhappy
impasse-many tax conscious clients virtually demand that their gift
tax program be so arranged as to permit recurring annual gifts free of
gift taxes, while cautious and well-informed attorneys are understandably reluctant to start their clients on a gift plan which must skirt so
many pitfalls in order to be successful.
Prior to 1950, the donor whose gift program was motivated in whole
or in part by a desire to decrease or eliminate his taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes was necessarily haunted by the very real possibility that his gifts might be held to have been made in contemplation

N

* Member of the Ohio Bar. The author acknowledges, with deep appreciation, the
valuable suggestions and criticisms made by Messrs. Milton R. Schlesinger and Howard M.
Kohn, of the Ohio Bar.
1 I.R.C., §1003(b)(3).
2 I.R.C., §IO00(f).
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of death;3 and therefore includible in his taxable estate.4 Since 1950,
however, the Internal Revenue Code has provided that no gift made
more than three years before the death of the donor will be considered
as made in contemplation of death.11 Accordingly, gift planning is now
substantially more attractive than heretofore.
The increased attractiveness of making lifetime gifts has undoubtedly stimulated interest in the use of the inter vivos trust. The inter
vivos trust offers many advantages that cannot be obtained by outright
gifts. Thus, the donor will often wish to vest management of the
donated property in others than the beneficiary, perhaps in himself.
The beneficiary may be a minor or incompetent, making outright gifts
impractical for a variety of reasons. 6 Often the donor will be impressed
with the high degree of flexibility as to income and principal distributions that is afforded by the trust device. In addition, the donor might
wish to use the trust device in order to avoid the inclusion of the gift
property in the taxable estate of the beneficiary.
Relatively recent cases, however, have more than justified the
estate planner's reluctance to use the inter vivos trust when one of the
donor's principal objectives is to obtain the annual exclusion. This
reluctance on the part of the estate planner sterns from the surprisingly
little understood requirement that a gift must be a "present interest" in
order to qualify for the exclusion. A gift of a "future interest," no
matter how small in amount, must be reported for gift tax purposes.7
The difficulty, perhaps indeed the impossibility, of drafting an inter
vivos trust which will qualify gifts as a "present interest," is a very real
one.
The purposes of this article are to outline the "future interest" pitfalls in the use of various conventional trust provisions, to explore remedial drafting possibilities even under the present law, and to suggest
a statutory amendment which will eliminate the fundamental defects
of the present poorly-drafted law.
s A substantial motive to avoid estate tax is persuasive of a transfer made in contemplation of death. Rickenberg v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 114, cert. den.
338 U.S. 949 (1950); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, (2d Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d)
794, cert. den. 306 U.S. 648 (1939); Vanderlip v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1946) 155 F.
(2d) 152.
4 I.R.C., §8ll(c), as effective prior to September 24, 1950.
5 I.R.C., §811(1).
6 See in this connection, Shattuck, "Gifts to Minors," 90 TnuST & Es'l'ATBS 659
(1951); Fleming, "Gifts for the Benefit of Minors," 49 MicH. L. REv. 529 (1951).
7I.R.C., §1003(b)(3).
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DEFINITION OF "PRESENT INTEREST"

The Regulations define "future interests" as any interests "whether
vested or contingent, and whether or not supported by a particular interest or estate, which are limited to commence in use, possession, or
enjoyment at some future date or time." 8 A "present interest" must
therefore be an interest or estate, whether vested or contingent, which
is limited to commence in possession or enjoyment immediately. Obviously, the common law concept of a vested interest is entirely irrelevant.9 So also is any consideration of when legal or equitable
ownership begins.10 To constitute a present interest the donee must
have the right to the present possession or enjoyment of the property.
''The question is of time, not when title vests, but when enjoyment
begins. "11
This much can be gleaned from a reading of the definition
advanced by Congress and the Commissioner. The actual task, however, of drafting a trust which will give the beneficiary a present interest faces many pitfalls which are not apparent from the mere reading
of definitions.
DRAFTING PITFALLS

I. Accumulation of income. The cases are clear that a gift to a
trust which directs that the income be accumulated for a term of years
is a gift of a future interest and, accordingly, is not entitled to the
annual exclusion.12
2. Discretionary power over income. Equally well settled is the
proposition that a discretionary power in the trustee to distribute income to or for the benefit of the beneficiary or to withhold and accumulate such income results in a future interest, thereby making the
exclusion unavailable.13 This result obtains whether the discretionary
s U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.11. The committee reports define "future interests" in
substantially the same words. H. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st sess. 29 (1932). S. Rep. No.
665, 72d Cong., 1st sess. 41 (1932).
9Fondren v. United States, 324 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 499 (1945); Commissioner v.
Wells, (6th Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 405; Commissioner v. Glos, (7th Cir. 1941) 123 F.
(2d) 548; Welch v. Paine, (1st Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 141.
lOFondren v. United States, 324 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 499 (1945).
UJd. at 20.
12 United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 61 S.Ct. 659 (1941); Welch v. Paine, (1st
Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 141; Commissioner v. Glos, (7th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 548.
1s Fondren v. United States, 324 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 499 (1945); Commissioner v.
Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945); Commissioner v. Brandegee, (1st Cir.
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power is subject to a standard, presumably enforceable by a court of
equity,1 4 or whether the power is subject to no standard at all.15 So,
also, is the exclusion denied where all of the income must be distributed but ·where the trustee has the power to change the relative
amounts which each of several beneficiaries will receive. 16 In each
case, the gift is a future interest because the beneficiary has no absolute
right to the enjoyment of an ascertainable amount of income commencing immediately and continuing for life or for a definite number of
years.17
The relatively large number of cases18 holding that gifts to a dis~etionary trust are gifts of a future interest suggests that attorneys have
been extremely reluctant to accept this result. This reluctance probably stems from the fact that the beneficiary of the discretionary trust
is usually a minor child and, consequently, a mandatory direction to
distribute income would ordinarily be unrealistic and unwise. Furthermore, in view of the legal restrictions imposed upon guardians in the
use of a ward's property,1 9 the compelling argument has been made
that a discretionary trust for a minor, authorizing distributions of income pursuant to a broad standard and providing for termination when
the beneficiary attains majority, gives the minor at least as much assurance of obtaining present enjoyment of the income as would a gift outright to him or to his legal or natural guardian.20 Any hope that at1941) 123 F. (2d) 58; Commissioner v. Taylor, (3d Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 714, cert.
den. 314 U.S. 699 (1942); Commissioner v. Gardner, (7th Cir. 1942) 127 F. (2d) 929;
French v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 254; Hutchings v. Commissioner,
(5th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 422.
14 Fondren v. United States, 324 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 499 (1945); Commissioner v.
Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945).
15 French v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 254; Hutchings v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 422; United States v. Knell, (7th Cir. 1945)
149 F. (2d) 331.
16 Helvering v. Blair, (2d Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 945; Vogel v. United States, (D.C.
Mass. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 103.
17 If it can be established that the beneficiary has a need for funds at the time that
the gift in trust is made, and the trustee is therefore under a duty to distribute income to
him and the trust instrument or the circumstances indicate that some ascertainable amount
of income will continue to be distributed in the future, then the income interest should
qualify as a present interest. See Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 65 S.Ct. 1328
(1945). In short, it must be shown that despite the words of the trust instrument, the
trustee actually has no right to withhold income and will not have such right in the future.
One early case seems to have met this heavy burden. Smith v. Commissioner, (8th Cir.
1942) 131 F. (2d) 254. The Smith case, however, has been criticized by the Tax Court,
in Simon Guggenheim, 1 T.C. 845 (1943).
18 See note 13 supra.
19 See note 6 supra.
20 55 HAnv. L. R:sv. 302 (1941). See dissenting opinion of Judge Maris in Commis•
sioner v. Taylor, (3d Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 714, cert. den. 314 U.S. 699 (1942). One
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tomeys may have entertained for eventual success with this argument
was dispelled in 1945 by the Supreme Court cases of Fondren '11.
United States2 1 and Commissioner '11. Disston,22 which established conclusively that gifts to a discretionary trust, even though for the benefit
of a minor beneficiary,23 give rise to a future interest.
Conversely, a gift in trust which requires that the income be distributed currently to the beneficiary will give rise to a present interest.24 It is essential to point out, however, even though we thereby
digress for a moment, that only the present value of the income interest
is a present interest-the value of the corpus (the remainder interest)
is a future interest, its distribution being postponed to some future
date. 25 Thus, a gift in trust providing for the periodic (annual or more
often) distribution of income to the beneficiary until he attains the age
of 25 and the outright distribution of principal. at age 25 would result
in the availability of the exclusion to the extent of the present value
of the income to age 25 26 and an includible gift for gift tax purposes to
the extent of the excess value.
A moment's reflection will indicate that the allowance of an exclusion only to the extent of the present value of the income interest
results in certain absurdities. We would probably all agree that the
payment of income in the future is no more a present interest than is
the payment of principal in the future. It is clear, for example, that
if a gift in trust were made on January 1, 1952, and the trust instruconclusion that can be drawn from this argument is that no gift to a minor, whether outright to him, to his guardian, or in trust for his benefit, can qualify as a present interest.
This point is developed in greater detail, infra pages 638-639.
21324 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 499 (1945).
22 325 U.S. 442, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945).
23 "The statute in this respect purports to make no distinction between gifts to minors
and gifts to adults. If there is deferment in either case, the exemption is denied." Fondren
v. United States, 324 U.S. 18 at 28 (1945).
24 Payment of income to the beneficiary once a year is sufficient to qualify as a present
interest, even though the income may thereby be withheld for as long as one year. Fisher
v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 383. But cf. Hessenbruch v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1950) 178 F. (2d) 785, which held that a gift in trust for the benefit of
a person 20 years and 9 months of age was a future interest because the income was not
required to be paid out until the beneficiary attained 21.
25 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945); Fisher v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 383; Charles v. Hassett, (D.C. Mass. 1942) 43 F.
Supp. 432; Sensenbrenner v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 883.
26 The value of the income interest is computed on the basis of its duration until the
beneficiary attains 25 and not on the life expectancy of the beneficiary even though he will
continue presumably to receive the income after the outright distribution of principal to
him. Fisher v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 383.
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ment provided that the first payment of income were to be made on
December 31, 1953, the entire gift would be a future interest.27 Yet
if the trus.t instrument were altered to provide that the first payment
of income should be made on December 31, 1952, not only would the
firsi: payment (for the current year) be a present interest, but in addition the second payment, on December 31, 1953, would be transformed
into a present interest. If the trust instrument were further altered to
provide that in addition to the income payments at the end of the years
1952 and 1953, one-half of the principal were to be paid out on July
l, 1954, it is equaHy clear that the payment of principal in 1954
would be classified as a future interest.28 The payment of income
in 1953 qualifies as a present interest because it is part of an unbroken
series of income payments which starts presently even though it embraces payments which will not be made within the current income
period. Yet from any logical viewpoint, the second payment of income, in 1953, is no more a present interest than is the payment of
principal in 1954. Perhaps the answer should be that all payments
in the future, whether of income or principal, are future interests.
Such answer would have at least the virtue of logical consistency. 29
The accepted ·answer, although not quite so harsh on donors, sacrifices
both logic and simplicity.
A related absurdity is the fact that the value of the present interest
often increases as the beneficiary's interest in the trust estate decreases.
Suppose, for example, that the trust instrument provides that income is
to be paid to the beneficiary for five years and at the end of five years
the principal is to be distributed outright to the beneficiary. A gift to
such a trust would be a present interest to the extent of the present
value of the income for five years. The exclusion, accordingly, would
be limited to that amount. 30 If, however, the income were to be paid
to the beneficiary for his lifetime and at his death the principal distributed to designated remaindermen, the value of the present interest
would be the present value of the income for the period corresponding
to the beneficiary's life expectancy. In the latter case the gift tax ex27 Cases cited in
28 Cases cited in
29 It would also

note 12 supra.
note 25 supra.
have the blessing of Judge Wyzanski who, in his very discerning
opinion in Charles v. Hassett, (D.C. Mass. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 432, pointed out the in•
consistency and expressed his preference for the conclusion that all future payments should
be future interests.
so Fisher v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 383; Charles v. Hassett,
(D.C. Mass. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 432. Even if the remainder had to be distributed to the
income beneficiary or his estate, it still would not qualify for the exclusion.
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clusion might be many times greater than in the first case, despite the
fact that the beneficiary in the latter case received something of less
value.31
,
3. Power to invade principal. Suppose a transfer in trust which
provides that income must be distributed annually to the beneficiary
for twenty years, at the end of which time the trust is to terminate and
the principal is to be distributed outright to the beneficiary. We have
seen that such transfer would give rise to an exclusion to the extent of
the present value of the income for a twenty-year period. Suppose,
however, that in addition to the above provisions, the trustee has the
power to distribute to the beneficiary from time to time such amounts
of principal as the trustee deems necessary or appropriate for the beneficiary's health, support, comfort and maintenance.32 The possibility
that the beneficiary may receive some or all of the principal prior to the
expiration of twenty years is of course a future interest.33 Accordingly,
few lawyers would expect the value of the present interest in income
to be increased by the added provision for principal invasions. On the
other hand, without the benefit of recent cases, few lawyers would
expect that the addition of a power to invade principal would defeat
the exclusion otherwise obtainable to the extent of the present interest
in income. Yet the latter result seems to be clearly established.34
The development of the rule has not been free of substantial doubt.
As late as 1947, a memorandum decision of the Tax Court allowed an
exclusion for the present value of an income interest despite the existence of a discretionary power to invade principal for the benefit of the
income beneficiaries.35 And as late as 1949, the government conceded, under similar facts, the availability of an exclusion to the extent
of the income interest.36 However, as early as 1943 the Tax Court
held that where the income was required to be paid out at the inception of the trust but where the trustees had the power to sell the real
estate forming the corpus of the trust and therea~er to distribute the
31 See

Charles v. Hassett, (D.C. Mass. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 432.
power in the trustee to invade principal, whether subject to a broad or limited
standard or to no standard at all, is wisely considered by most draftsmen to be one of the
most essential attributes of a good trust instrument.
33 ". • • the right to receive principal through the power of the trustees to invade it
is future interest••.•" Kniep v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 755 at 757.
34Evans v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1952) 52-2 U.S.T.C., iJI0,862; Kniep v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 755; Margaret A. C. Riter, 3 T.C. 301 (1944);
Andrew Geller, 9 T.C. 484 (1947). Jennie Brody, 1952 CCH T.C. Rep. Dec. No. 19,281.
35 Louise L. McCoy, 6 T.C.M. 1097 (1947).
36 Jesse S. Phillips, 12 T.C. 216 (1949).
32 A
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income and principal in their (the trustees') discretion, the present
interest was incapable of valuation because the right to the income had
no definite life. Accordingly, no exclusion was allowed.37 A year
later the
Court disallowed the exclusion in a case where the trustee
could distribute principal to the income beneficiary or to the beneficiary's son.38 Both of these cases, however, although anticipating the
present rule, were distinguishable from our hypothetical case. In the
first of the two cases, the beneficiaries' unqualified right to income
would be extinguished by the subsequent sale of the corpus of the trust,
whereas in our hypothetical case, the beneficiary would presumably
receive the income on any principal distributed outright to him. In the
second of the two cases, the principal could be distributed to someone
other than the income beneficiary,39 in which event the income beneficiary would be deprived of both income and principal, whereas in
our hypothetical case the exercise of the power to invade principal
would result in the income beneficiary receiving the principal as well
as the income.
As a result of three recent cases, however, the rule seems clearly to
be that a power to invade principal will eliminate any exclusion even
though the principal must be distributed to the income beneficiary.40
In Kniep v. Commissioner,4 1 a gift was made in trust, providing for the
equal distribution of the income to six beneficiaries until each attained
sixty years of age at which time a proportionate part of the principal
was to be distributed outright. In addition, the trustee had the discretionary power to invade principal but not in excess of $1,000 per year
for each beneficiary. Any principal invasion was to be considered an
advance on the principal ultimately distributable to such beneficiary,
but was not to affect his right to equal income distributions in the
interim. Both the Tax Court42 and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that the value of the income interest must be computed on
the assumption that the maximum invasions, $6,000 per year, would
be made. If, however, principal invasions solely for the benefit of the
income beneficiary do not decrease the value of the present interest,
the court should have held (if the question was raised) that the value

Tax

87 John M. Smyth, 2 T.C.M. 4 (1943).
38 Margaret A. C. Riter, 3 T.C. 301 (1944).
89 A similar element was present in Andrew Geller,

9 T.C. 484 (1947).
40Kniep v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 755; Evans v. Commissioner,
(3d Cir. 1952) 52-2 U.S.T.C., ,rI0,862.
41 (8th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 755.
42 William Harry Kniep, 9 T.C. 943 (1947).
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of the present interest must be computed on the assumption that principal invasions of $5,000 would be made. This is so because the most
that any one beneficiary could be deprived of each year was his proportionate share of the income on $5,000 of principal. Since the
court assumed a decline in principal of $6,000 per year, instead of
$5,000, the decision perhaps stands for the proposition that the value
of a beneficiary's income right must be reduced on account of principal invasions which may be made solely to him.43
In Evans v. Commissioner,44 the taxpayer made a gift in trust for
the equal benefit of each of six children. The trust instrument directed
the trustee to distribute the income of each beneficiary's share to
the respective beneficiary for life. In addition, the trustee could distribute to the beneficiary such amounts of principal as the trustee deemed necessary for the education, comfort and support of the beneficiary
or his spouse or children. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the present interest in income was incapable of valuation because the corpus of the trust could be exhausted at any time and therefore disallowed any exclusion. In the course of its opinion the court
made it clear that the fact that payments of principal could be made
only to the income beneficiary was unimportant since the difficulty
was one of valuing the income interest.
The taxpayer in the Evans case argued that the distribution of
principal to the income beneficiary, pursuant to the trustee's discretionary power of invasion, would not cut down the beneficiary's interest but rather would augment his beneficial interest in the gift. Although the court denied the availability of the exclusion, it is not
likely that it disagreed with the taxpayer's premise that the presence of
a power of invasion which can be exercised only for the income beneficiary augments the beneficiary's interest in the subject of the gift.
The beneficiary's interest is augmented, however, only because the
power to invade principal makes possible the receipt of principal in the
future-a future interest-and thereby makes impossible the determination of the amount of future income payments-the only present
interest. If we start with the rule that the income interest must be
computed separately from the principal interest, the result obtained
43 The Kniep case is weak authority for this proposition, however, because the opinion
does not indicate that the question of whether the decline in principal should be $5,000
or $6,000 was in issue.
44 (3d Cir. 1952) 52-2 U.S.T.C. ifl0,862.
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in the Evans case is perhaps inevitable.45 Disallowing the exclusion,
however, on a ground which means a greater beneficial interest was
given to the donee, seems to be nothing short of absurd.
4. Power to pay debts and incumbrances out of income. In order
for the donor to obtain the gift tax exclusion, the beneficiary of a gift
in trust must have the right to the immediate enjoyment of an ascertainable portion of the trust income for life or for a certain number of
years. Suppose that the trust instrument authorizes the trustee to
borrow and permits, either expressly or impliedly, the trustee to repay
the debt out of income. Can the government successfully argue that
the duration of the beneficiary's right to the income is uncertain and
that therefore the present interest in the income cannot be valued?
Although no case has unequivocally so held, the government would
very likely prevail with this argument.
In Bristol v. W elch46 the taxpayer created a funded life insurance
trust which provided that any income not used for payment of insurance premiums, and for taxes and liens on real estate, was to be
distributed to the beneficiaries. In subsequent years, the taxpayer
made additional gifts of insurance policies and encumbered real estate
to the trust. The district court held that the subsequent gifts were gifts
of future interests and stated:
"Such a power [to pay premiums on insurance policies out of
income] vested in the trustees is not compatible with the existence
of a present interest.... Further, ... the trust agreement allowed
the trustees before computing the net distributable income to pay
off any taxes and liens due or to become due on the real estate.
This power must be considered in conjunction with the right of
the trustees to add property to the trust." 41

It is quite likely that, in the Bristol case, the immediate premium
charges plus the amortizing payments on encumbrances existing at
the time of the gifts were at least as great as the currently available
income and that therefore no income was immediately distributable
to the beneficiaries. If that was indeed the fact, the Bristol case falls
in the same category as the cases disallowing the exclusion because the
45 It is :interesting to note that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied, for
its decision :in the Evans case, not on the Kniep case, but on the cases of Sensenbrenner v.
Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 883 and Fisher v. Commissioner, (9th Cir.
1942) 132 F. (2d) 383, which held that the principal interest must be valued separately
from the :income interest.
46 (D.C. Mass. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 676.
47 Id. at 678. Italics added.
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income was to be accumulated· and added to principal.48 The emphasized portions of the quotation from the opinion indicate, however,
that the bare power to divert income in the future from the immediate
use of the beneficiaries in order to build up the corpus of the trust is
incompatible with a present interest.
In Howe v. Commissioner 49 the taxpayer conveyed real estate
in trust for his seven children, giving the trustee broad powers to
improve, subdivide and sell the land. Any income not needed to create
a reserve for taxes and other obligations was to be distributed to the
beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
a future interest was created to the full extent of the property transferred, relying on the facts that ( 1) the beneficiaries had no right
to the income because the trustee could use it for improving the land
and (2) the trustee had broad discretionary powers to create a reserve
out of income. Thus, the court's refusal to allow an exclusion was
based, at least in part, on the power of the trustee to use the income
in the future in such a way as to deprive the beneficiaries temporarily
of its enjoyment.
In the Bristol case, there was probably an immediate requirement
that the income, in effect, be accumulated.50 In the Howe case the
circumstances indicated that accumulation was the immediate and primary purpose of the trust. In both the Bristol and Howe cases, it is
probable that no present interest was ever created since there may
have been no income available for the beneficiaries even at the inception of the trust. In our hypothetical case, a present interest is created
because the income is currently payable to the beneficiary. It is impossible, however, to value that present interest since the trustee can at
any time terminate the beneficiary's right to the income simply by
borrowing money and repaying such loan out of income. Thus, no
convincing distinction can be drawn between the Evans case, in which
the trustee could terminate the steady flow of income to the beneficiary
by distributing principal to him and our hypothetical case, where the
trustee has a like power by borrowing money. The valuation of the
present interest would seem to be equally impossible in both cases
since the duration of the present interest is entirely conjectural.
5. Spendthri~ clause. Most trust draftsmen usually prefer to
include in the trust instrument a provision commonly referred to as a
48 E.g., Mary R. Nelson, 46 B.T.A. 653 (1942).
49(7th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 310, cert. den. 324 U.S. 841 (1945).
50 The same factor was present in Mary R. Nelson, 46 B.T.A. 653 (1942).

632

MICHIGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

"spendthrift clause." The purpose of the spendthrift clause is to
prohibit the voluntary assignment by the beneficiary, or the forced
assignment by some type of creditors' process, of the income or principal
of the trust while it is still in the hands of the trustee.51 The restrictive
type of spendthrift clause simply prohibits the beneficiary from assigning his interest by way of anticipation and purports to make such
interest free of execution by creditors. The more complex forfeiture
type of spendthrift clause goes on to provide that in case of attempted
alienation or execution all interest of the beneficiary in the trust shall
cease, but usually adds that in such event the trustee may in his discretion pay out income and/or principal to or for the benefit of the
former beneficiary. 52
Despite the fact that no case has squarely so held, it is fairly clear
that the restrictive type of spendthrift clause will not prevent an
exclusion for a present income interest.53 The restriction on the beneficiary or his creditors to assign his rights to future income or principal
in no wise impairs the guarantee that he will receive the current income
for life or a stated number of years. Indeed, the restriction increases
the assurance that he will receive such income. Accordingly, the
restrictive type spendthrift clause can be used without fear of endangering the allowance of the exclusion.
The use of the forfeiture type of clause, however, raises some
doubt. If the beneficiary, or his creditors, attempt any of the prohibited acts, the beneficiary's right to the income ceases; any subsequent receipt of income by him through the exercise by the trustee of
his discretion to distribute income in spite of the forfeiture will not
be by way of a present interest. Thus, the beneficiary's right to the
income is of indeterminate duration and accordingly, so the argument
would go, the present interest is incapable of valuation.
51 For an authoritative discussion of the spendthrift trust, its effect and its validity
in various jurisdictions, see GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed. (1947).
52 Although the forfeiture clause does not create a true spendthrift trust, its purpose
and effect are substantially the same. For the sake of convenience, the forfeiture clause
will be referred to in this article as a type of spendthrift clause. "Where the validity of
the restrictive type clause is doubtful, the forfeiture type clause is the only safe spendthrift
provision. See GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§ 12 and 574 (1947).
53 In Charles v. Hassett, (D.C. Mass. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 432, the court stated that
the presence of a spendthrift clause was irrelevant to the exclusion question. In at least
three cases, a restrictive type spendthrift clause was contained in the trust instrument but
was ignored in the opinion. The Commissioner, however, may not have raised the ques•
tion. Fisher v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 383; Smith v. Commissioner,
(8th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 254; Hutchings v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1944) 141 F.
(2d) 422.
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It is impossible to state with any reasonable assurance whether
the courts would or would not accept this argument if it were urged
by the Commissioner. Unlike the situation where the trustee has the
discretionary power to invade principal or to borrow money, the use of
the forfeiture type spendthrift clause does not give the trustee the
discretionary power to terminate the beneficiary's present income interest. Indeed, to the extent that the invoking of the spendthrift clause is
dependent on the beneficiary's voluntary act, the beneficiary himself
has the power to determine whether his present income interest will
be terminated. And even to the extent that the invoking of the clause
is dependent on the acts of the beneficiary's creditor, the beneficiary
nevertheless may have a large measure of control.
On the other hand, we have no assurance that control in the beneficiary is a relevant factor in valuing the present income interest. Consider, for example, a gift in trust providing for the distribution of income to the beneficiary for twenty years, with the added provision that
at any time after the expiration of ten years the beneficiary may terminate the trust and receive the principal outright. We may guess that
despite the complete control in the beneficiary to permit the trust to
last for twenty years the present income interest would be valued on the
basis of its duration for ten years.
6. Power to acquire non-productive property.
Most modem
trust agreements provide that the trustee shall have broad powers of sale
and investment without regard to the rules of equity or chancery courts.
So broad a power will usually include the power to acquire non-productive property. Can it not be argued, however, that a power in the
trustee to make the trust non-income-producing makes the valuation of
the present income interest impossible?
Ordinarily, the value of a present income interest is computed on
the basis of a hypothetical annuity of three and one-half per cent per
annum,54 even though the amount of income that will be received cannot be forecast with any reasonable degree of accuracy.55 Although
it would thus appear that a power in the trustee to convert the trust
corpus to non-income-producing property is thereby tacitly approved,
it may be that the three and one-half per cent valuation rule is appliM U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.19, as amended by T.D. 5902 on May 27, 1952. For
gifts made prior to January 1, 1952, a factor of 4 per cent is used. Id.
55 Commissioner v. Lowden, (7th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 127; Pauline W. Tidemann, 1 T.C. 968 (1943).
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cable only when the receipt of at least some amount of income can be
reasonably predicted.
The cases bearing most closely on this question are divided. In
Commissioner 11. Kempner,56 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, relying solely on the dispositive provisions of the trust instrument,
allowed an exclusion despite the fact that the corpus of the trust was
non-interest bearing notes:n If the Kempner case is correct in holding that the exclusion is available even though the very subject of the
gift in trust was non-productive property, then it should of course follow that a mere power in the trustee to convert productive property to
non-productive property will not preclude obtaining the exclusion.
However, in Elizabeth H. Polk,58 the Tax Court denied an exclu·
sion for a gift in trust, stating:
"The record establishes that the trust corpus had a market
value of $9,000, but there is no evidence that the right to receive
the trust income had any value.... Furthermore, it may be noted
that the record shows that from 1928 until the date of trial in this
proceeding only one dividend had been paid on the . . . stock
and no dividends had been paid since the creation of the trust.
The taxpayer has not sustained her burden of proving that the
gift of income had value and the amount thereof."59

If the Polk case is correct in holding that an exclusion cannot be
obtained when the gift in trust is of non-productive property, it should
logically follow that a power in the trustee to convert productive property to non-productive property precludes obtaining the exclusion.
Surely the possibility that the trustee will exercise such power, and
thereby terminate the present income interest, is substantial enough
to make the valuation of the present interest impossible.
DRAFTING REMEDIES

It is entirely possible for the trust draftsman to draft a trust which
would eliminate all of the pitfalls discussed above. Thus, he could
56 (5th Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 853.
57 Jn John M. Smyth, 2 T.C.M. 4 at

6 (1943), the Tax Court stated: "The fact
that the properties produced no income :is not determinative. The question is the right to
receive the income if produced."
The court nevertheless denied the exclusion, relying partly on the fact that the rental
value of the trusteed real estate was not shown. It is impossible to weigh intelligently the
effect of the Smyth case on this question.
r;s 5 T.C.M. 357 (1946).
59 Id. at 359. The weight of the opinion is somewhat lessened by the fact that the
same result might have been reached on other grounds. Accord: Jesse S. Phillips, 12 T.C.
216 (1949). See Commissioner v. Boeing, (9th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 86; Andrew
Geller, 9 T.C. 484 (1947).
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avoid the pitfalls of the power to accumulate income and the discretionary power to distribute or withhold income simply by making it
mandatory that the income be distributed currently. He could avoid
the power to invade principal pitfall simply by eliminating it. He
could avoid the pitfall created by a power to repay loans out of income
by not giving the trustee such power or by expressly requiring that
any such repayment be made out of principal. He could avoid any
doubts as to the effect of the spendthrift clause on the availability of
the exclusion simply by eliminating it or by using the restrictive type
clause and, in jurisdictions where the validity of such clause is in
doubt, taking the calculated risk that an effective spendthrift trust is
thereby created. The broad investment power pitfall could be avoided
by limiting the trustee's power of investment to productive property.
These simple and obvious remedies are clearly available.
Drafting a trust, however, which contains none of the pitfalls
would be, in almost every conceivable case, extremely unwise from
every standpoint except gift tax saving. Many of those pitfalls are
occasioned by the use of trust provisions that are important, and often
essential, in most situations which call for the use of the trust device.
Sacrificing any one of those provisions for the tax saving which might
be effected would be a drastic and usually unwise step. When we
consider further that even after making such a sacrifice, the remainder
interest would still not qualify for the exclusion, the lure of tax saving
becomes even more senseless.
The desire to avoid taxes being what it is, however, it is not surprising that the ingenuity of lawyers has been called upon to draft a
trust which would retain the conventional trust safeguards while at
the same time obtain the annual gift tax exclusion. Indeed, several
cases have involved trusts which have accomplished the seemingly
impossible task of obtaining the exclusion for the full value of the
property transferred without sacrificing many of the traditional trust
safeguards.
In Strekalovsky v. Delaney, a gift was made in trust for the benefit of three minor children. As each child attained the age of twentyone he was to receive his share of the trust estate outright. Until such
time, the trustee could pay any part of the child's share to or for the
benefit of the child for any purpose whatsoever "in accordance with
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the needs and best interest of said child, as if the interest of each said,
child were held by the trustee herein as guardian for said child and as
if the trustee were making payments and distributions in that capacity
for the bene-fit of each child respectively."60
Ordinarily, giving the trustee discretionary power over income or
principal, even though subject to an enforceable standard, precludes
the allowance of any exclusion. 61 The district court in the Strekalovsky case held, however, that an exclusion should be allowed for the
full value of the gift, 62 relying on the fact that the trust instrument
clearly disclosed the donor's intention to give the beneficiaries the same
interest they W07!ld have obtained by an outright gi~.
Even though the standards regulating the trustee's exercise of discretion in Strekalovsky were the same standards imposed by law on a
legal guardian for a minor child, the rationale of the court seems to be
clearly wrong. 63 If the trust had not analogized the trustee's function
to that of a guardian but instead had recited the identical standards
which guided legal guardians under local law, the gift clearly would
have been a future interest. 64 The fact is that by the terms of the trust
instrument itself the beneficiaries were not entitled to the immediate
use or enjoyment of the income or principal. Reliance on the Strekalovsky case and the similar case of Cannon v. Robertson65 would be
dangerous. 66
A far more interesting possibility was disclosed in Kieckhefer v.
Commissioner.67 In that case, a gift was made in trust for the benefit
of a one-month-old beneficiary. The trustee was given the discretionary power to distribute income or principal for the education, comfort
and support of the beneficiary and was directed to accumulate any
(D.C. Mass. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 556 at 557. Italics added.
Cases cited in notes 14 and 15 supra.
62 The same result was obtained on substantially similar facts in Cannon v. Robertson,
(D.C. N.C. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 331.
63 The trust instrument also contained a provision giving the legal guardian of each
beneficiary the right to terminate the trust as to the beneficiary's share. This provision,
entirely ignored by the court, may make the decision right (see infra page 637), but leaves
the opinion nevertheless wrong. No such provision appeared in Cannon v. Robertson, supra
note 62.
64 Cases cited in note 14 supra.
65 (D.C. N.C. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 331.
66 See, however, Anderson, "Gifts to Children and Incompetents," 26 TAXEs 911
(1948), for a contrary view.
67 (7th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 118; noted, 65 HARv. L. REv. 703 (1952); 46 ILL. L.
REv. 636 (1951).
60
61
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income not so expended. The trust was to terminate when the beneficiary attained twenty-one years of age. In the interim, the beneficiary or his legally appointed guardian had the right at any time to
draw down all or any part of the trust estate. No guardian was ever
appointed for the beneficiary.
Clearly the trust would have given rise to a future interest but for
the presence of the power in the beneficiary or his guardian to draw
down the corpus. The Tax Court felt that the power of termination
did not change the result otherwise obtained because it was absurd to
expect the infant beneficiary to exercise the power and no guardian
was appointed who could exercise the power for him. Accordingly
the Tax Court denied the exclusion.68 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the Tax Court and allowed the
exclusion on the full value of the property transferred, relying on the
fact that the infant beneficiary had the unqualified right to draw down
the corpus and any harrier that existed to his exercise of that right was a
barrier imposed by law and not by the donor.
The Tax Court and the Second Circuit, however, have refused to
follow the decision of the Seventh Circuit in the Kieckhefer case. In
Stifel v. Commissioner,69 the facts were substantially the same as the
facts in the Kieckhefer case except that instead of one beneficiary one
month old there were three separate trusts for three beneficiaries, aged
four, seven and eleven, respectively. Also, there was some doubt,
from a reading of the trust instrument in Stifel, whether the minor
beneficiaries had the right to demand trust corpus or whether their
guardians alone could make such demand. (As in Kieckhefer, no
guardian was appointed.) The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit resolved this doubt in favor of the taxpayer by assuming that the
trust instrument gave the minor beneficiaries directly, as well as their
guardians, the right to terminate the trusts. ,Nevertheless both the
Tax Court and the Second Circuit held that the gifts made to such
trusts were gifts of future interests.
The Tax Court reasoned that there was no guardian in existence
who could exercise the right to terminate the trusts and, in addition,
the donor must have anticipated that a substantial period of time would
6s 15 T.C. 111 (1950).
69

(2d Cir. 1952) 52-1 U.S.T.C., ,rI0,855, affirming 17 T.C. 647 (1951).
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elapse before any occasion arose for terminating the trust. Under
these circumstances, concluded the court, "His [the donor's] real intent as shown by the instrument and the surrounding circumstances
controls." 70 It is difficult to accept this reasoning by the Tax Court.
Surely the determination of whether or not a present interest has been
created must depend upon an analysis of the exact interest that was
actually given, and not upon whether i:he donor anticipated that the
donated interest would be fully used by the beneficiary.71
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit based its affirmance
of Stifel, not on the subjective intent of the donor, but on an inquiry
into the capacity of the minor beneficiaries to exercise their right of
termination. Since, the court reasoned, no guardian was in existence
who could exercise such right for the beneficiaries72 and since the
minor beneficiaries themselves could not exercise such right, the gift
was one of a future interest.
A critical appraisal of the Kieckhefer and Stifel cases requires that
we first determine whether an outright gift to a minor qualifies as a
present interest. If it does not, then it would necessarily follow that
a right in a minor beneficiary of a trust to terminate the trust and thereby to acquire outright ownership could not give rise to a present
interest. If, however, an outright gift to a minor does qualify as a
present interest, then a right of termination in a minor beneficiary of
a trust might or might not give rise to a present interest, depending perhaps upon whether such right of termination in a minor can be equated
with outright ownership.
In recent years the argument has been advanced that no gift to a
minor, whether outright to him, to a guardian for him, or in trust for
his benefit, can qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion.73 The argument, very briefly, is that since the minor is disabled, either by his
extreme youth or by legal restrictions, from exercising actual physical
dominion over the subject of the gift, and since a gift to a guardian
10 17 T.C. 647 at 650 (1951).
71 See note, 7 TAX L. RBv. 500

(1952). This same erroneous use of the donor's state
of mind was made by a district court in Strekalovsky v. Delaney, (D.C. Mass. 1948) 78
F. Supp. 556, in holding that a present interest was created. See pages 635-636 supra.
72 The court suggested that the guardian might be appointed by the trust instrument
itself. It is doubtful, however, whether the laws of most states would recognize the appointment of a guardian by so informal a process.
73 Fleming, "Gifts for the Benefit of Minors," 49 M:rCH. L. RBv. 529 (1951); see,
also, notes: 7 TAX L. RBv. 84 and 89 (1951); 7 TAX L. RBv. 500 (1952).
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or a trustee necessarily means that actual physical dominion over the
subject of the gift will be postponed, every gift to or for the benefit of
a minor is a gift of a future interest. The argument, although interesting, seems clearly to be rebutted by the cases. At least two cases have
held that an outright gift to a minor gave rise to a present interest,
even though no guardian had been appointed for the donee. 74 In
addition, several cases have held that a direction to pay income to or
for the benefit of the trust beneficiary gave rise to a present interest in
income even though the trust beneficiary was a minor.75 It is not
likely that these authorities will be overruled.
There can be little question, also, but that an unqualified right to
acquire outright ownership will ordinarily be equated for tax purposes
with outright ownership. If, for example, an adult beneficiary of a
trust were to have the unqualified right to terminate the trust and
acquire outright ownership of the corpus, even the Second Circuit
would apparently agree that a gift to such a trust would give rise to a
present interest.76 Does the minority of the beneficiary, however, so
qualify the right of termination that a different result should obtain?
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Stifel, apparently
felt that the right of termination, although unqualified by the terms of
the trust instrument, was nevertheless qualified by the fact that a minor
is incapable of exercising such a right. The court's apparent assumption, however, that a minor is incapable of exercising a power of termination is difficult to understand. Did it mean that state law would
prohibit a minor's exercise of such right? Did it mean that a court
would not compel a trustee to honor a minor's request for termination
of the trust? Or did the court mean that a minor was physically and
mentally incapable of performing the necessary acts?
It is extremely doubtful that the law of any state prohibits a minor
beneficiary from exercising a power of termination expressly granted
to him by the terms of the trust. Ordinarily the so-called "disabilities"
Charles F. Roeser, 2 T.C. 298 (1943); John E. Daniels, IO T.C.M. 147 (1951).
Commissioner v. Sharp, (9th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 163; Fisher v. Commissioner,
(9th Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 383; Jesse S. Phillips, 12 T.C. 216 (1949); Louise L. McCoy,
6 T.C.M. 1097 (1947). The issue of the income beneficiary's minority, however, was
probably not raised by the Commissioner. See Frances M. Rassas, 17 T.C. 160 (1951),
affd. (7th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 611.
76 "If an adult had been the beneficiary of each of these trusts, of course the gifts
would not have been of future interests...•" Stifel v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1952) 52-1
U.S.T.C., 1110,855.
74

75
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of minority are not really disabilities at all but rather are privileges.
Thus, under certain circumstances a person may disaffirm purchases,
sales, and contractual obligations made by him while a minor.
Although the law may thus cast an onerous burden on the parties with
whom a minor deals, it rarely prevents the minor from acting. It is
difficult to believe that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in the Stifel case, was thinking in terms of an imagined legal disability
on the part of the minor.
If a minor is under no legal disability to act, and if the trust instrument gives the trustee no discretionary authority to refuse to honor
the beneficiary's request for termination, it would seem inevitably to
follow that a court would compel compliance by the trustee. Suppose,
however, that the beneficiary. exercising such power is two years of
age, barely old enough to voice his request and surely too young to
appreciate the consequences of his request. Would a court nevertheless compel compliance by the trustee? If an affirmative answer seems
ridiculous, suppose further that the trust instrument was very explicit
that the trustee must honor any request for termination, regardless of
the age of the beneficiary and regardless of the probable consequences.
On what possible basis could a court then refuse to compel compliance?
Or suppose, as the other extreme, that the beneficiary possessing the
power was twenty years and eleven months of age. Is it even conceivable that a court would refuse to enforce the clear command of the
trust instrument on the ground that the beneficiary was one month too
young? It is difficult to interpret the broad language of the Second
Circuit as indicating that the court was thinking in terms of a state
court's probable action in this kind of situation.
It is likely that the court based its decision on the assumed physical and mental incapacity of the minor beneficiaries to perform the
acts necessary to effect a termination of the trust. 77 If so, it may be
doubted whether an eleven-year-old, or even a seven-year-old, child
might not have sufficient ability to form a desire to acquire the trust
corpus and to make an effective demand upon the trustee. In any
event, the apparent rationale of the court's decision should require that
in each case where a minor beneficiary has a power to terminate the
77 Such, at any rate, was apparently the view of the Tax Court in John W. Kieckhefer,
15 T.C. 111 (1950).
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trust the court must inquire into the intelligence of the minor beneficiary. The practical difficulty of administering such a rule, and the
open invitation to controversy and litigation that it affords, are sufficient reasons alone to make the Stifel decision undesirable.
It must of course be conceded that a child who has not attained a
certain minimum level of intelligence will not and, indeed, cannot
himself obtain the actual physical use and possession of any part of
the trust corpus. If so personal a dominion by the beneficiary over
the trust corpus is required, then the result in the Stifel case may be
correct. 78 There is no convincing reason, however, for narrowing the
concept of present interest to mean actual physical dominion. Just as
outright ownership of property by a minor qualifies as a present interest
despite the fact that the minor's effective dominion over the property
depends upon his having attained a certain minimum level of intelligence, so also the rule should be that if a minor has the unqualified
right to draw down the trust corpus and the only barrier to his exercise
of that right is a barrier imposed by the beneficiary's tender age, but
not by the terms of the donor's gift, then the gift is one of a present
interest.
What, then, is the present status of the "Kieckhefer clause"? First
of all, it is clear that the Kieckhefer clause will give rise to a present
interest if the beneficiary of the trust is an adult. Also, the Stifel case
suggests that the Kieckhefer clause would have given rise to a present
interest despite the minority of the beneficaries if a guardian who was
not under the control of the donor had been appointed.79 Where the
beneficiary of the trust is a minor, however, and a guardian for such
beneficiary is not in existence at the time the gift in trust is made, the
use of the Kieckhefer clause in order to qualify gifts in trust for the
annual gift tax exclusion will entail a very definite risk.
7 8 The court might properly have inquired whether one or more of the beneficiaries,
aged four, seven and eleven, respectively, had attained that minimum level of intelligence.
79 Judging from present analogous authority, the court's suggestion seems eminently
sound. An outright gift to a minor through his legal guardian probably gives rise to an
exclusion. Commissioner v. Sharp, (9th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 163; Edward J. Kelly,
1952 CCH T.C. Rep., Dec. No. 19,241. See Strekalovsky v. Delaney, (D.C. Mass. 1948)
78 F. Supp. 556; John E. Daniels, 10 T.C.M. 147 (1951). If the exercise of ownership
rights by a legal guardian is imputed to the minor ward for the purpose of obtaining an
exclusion on an outright gift, it should follow that the present power of an existing legal
guardian to exercise a minor's right of termination be considered the minor's power for the
purpose of obtaining an exclusion on a gift in trust.
·
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Nevertheless, one may hazard the guess that many trust draftsmen
are using the Kieckhefer clause despite the -uncertainty as to its effectiveness. The benefits that may be obtained if the Kieckhefer clause
is eventually upheld are a strong temptation to tax-conscious donors.
Thus, by using the Kieckhefer clause, the full value of a gift in trust
may qualify for the exclusion even though the income will be accumulated or distributed in the trustee's discretion (except as the Kieckhefer
clause may be invoked), even though the trustee may invade principal
in his discretion, and even though the trustee is given very broad powers to borrow and repay such debt out of income, and to sell productive
property and to invest in non-productive property. 80
·
Indeed, one may venture the second guess that the Kieckhefer
clause may be used indiscriminately and without adequate consideration of its full implications. The donor and the draftsman alike must
recognize that giving the beneficiary a power to terminate the trust
may subvert every purpose, other than gift tax saving, that the donor
may have for using the trust device. The indiscriminate use of the
Kieckhefer clause may often result in the beneficiary having a complete
command of the entire trust property in a situation where the donor
might more wisely protect the beneficiary from himself. 81
A second caveat to the use of the Kieckhefer clause is the fact that
the unlimited power in the beneficiary to terminate the trust constitutes
a taxable power of appointment for federal estate tax purposes.82 Even
if the beneficiary does not exercise the power, the trust corpus will be
includible in his taxable estate if he should die during the term of the
trust. 83
In order to avoid the possibility of the entire corpus of the trust
being includible in the taxable estate of the beneficiary and in order
to lessen the temptation to the beneficiary to exercise the power of
termination, the power of termination should be limited to the amount
80 The cautious draftsman may refrain, however, from qualifying the Kieckhefer clause
by any type of spendthrift clause. If the spendthrift clause were an effective qualification
of the Kieckhefer clause, the Commissioner might argue that the beneficiary's command
over the trust property was thereby fettered and accordingly the exclusion was unavailable.
81 See Drexler, "The Exclusion Provision of the Gift Tax Law Needs Amending," 29
T.AXlls 743 (1951).
82 I.R.C., §§811(£)(2) and (3).
83 Even in the absence of a Kieckhefer clause, the trust corpus will be includible in
the beneficiary's taxable estate if the corpus is payable to his estate at his death. I.R.C.,
§Sll(a); see Estate of Kinney v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1935) 80 F. (2d) 568.
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of the gi~ made to the trust during the calendar year in which the
termination power is exercised. With such a limited termination
power, the beneficiary at his death would have no power of appointment over property given to the trust in prior years. Also, if the beneficiary' s only reward for exercising his power of termination is the
~mount of the current gift, he may well persuade himself to abide by
the donor's plan.
Such a limited Kieckhefer clause might be the magic formula so
long sought by many estate planners. It must be pointed out, however, that the failure of the beneficiary or his guardian to exercise his
power to draw down the current-year gift, with the consequent loss
of that power as to the particular gift, may constitute a "lapse of a
power of appointment" within the meaning of sections 811 (f) (5)
and 1000 (c) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code.84 Under those sections of the Internal Revenue Code, a lapse of a power of appointment is equated with a release of such power to the extent that the
property subject to the power exceeds the greater of $5,000 or 5 per
cent of the value of the assets out of which the exercise of the power
could be satisfied. For gift tax purposes, a release of a power of
appointment is considered a transfer of property by the individual
possessing the power.85 For estate tax purposes, the release of a power
of appointment makes the property subject to the power includible
in the beneficiary's taxable estate if the release is made by a "disposition
which is of such nature that if it were a transfer of property owned by
the ... [beneficiary], such property would be includible in the ...
[beneficiary's] gross estate under subsection ... 811 (c) or (d)."86
If the beneficiary dies during the term of the trust, the release would
seem clearly to have been a disposition of such nature as to make the
property includible in the beneficiary's taxable estate, on the theory
that the beneficiary made a transfer reserving the life interest.87
84 Both

sections were added to the Code in 1951.
§IO00(c)(2). Presumably the transfer would be of a future interest, and
therefore not subject to the benefit of the annual exclusion, if the ultimate recipient of the
property subject to the lapsed power is the remaindennan of a trust. Also, there is a
question of the extent of the gift. For example, if the lapsing beneficiary is himself the
beneficiary of a mandatory income distribution provision, then to the extent of his own
income interest in the lapsed property he has made no gift.
86 I.R.C., §8ll(f)(2).
s1 I.R.C., §8ll(c).
85 I.R.C.,
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Briefly, then, if the annual gift to the limited Kieckhefer trust
exceeds $5,000, the failure of the beneficiary to exercise his power of
termination will almost certainly result in the beneficiary's incurring
gift tax liability or cutting into his lifetime exemption, and is very
likely to result in increased estate tax liability at the time of the beneficiary' s death. Under the present status of the law88 the only certain
method of avoiding lapsed power of appointment problems is for the
donor to limit his gifts to the limited Kieckhefer trust to $5,000 per
year.
Thus, although the Kieckhefer clause may turn out to be an important addition to the trust designed to obtain the gift tax exclusion,
its use may result in the beneficiary having both a taxable power of
appointment for estate tax purposes and, tax considerations aside, too
extensive control over the trusteed property. Perhaps its most effective use can be made by limiting the power of termination to the
amount of the current gift. Where so limited, however, the donor
should be cautioned to limit his gifts to the trust to $5,000 per year,
else needless gift and estate tax liability may be unwittingly incurred.

A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REMEDY
The large volume of exclusion cases has produced a mass of pitfalls, technicalities and absurdities as an incident of the present interest
requirements. 89 Under the present status of the law, it is doubtful
whether any gift in trust can obtain the benefit of the annual
exclusion without sacrificing many of the salutary and necessary provisions of a well-drafted trust. Even if the Supreme Court should
eventually give its approval to the Kieckhefer clause, its use will
require a hyper-technical knowledge of tax pitfalls on the part of the
trust draftsman. The ironic fact is that the entire present interest
requirement is an unnecessary appendage to the gift tax law-seemingly adopted without adequate thought and retained through sheer
inertia. It is an unnecessary appendage, not merely from the standpoint of donors ( whose own private interests should not determine
the incidence of the gift tax), but also from the broad standpoint of
government fiscal need and desirability.
88There are, as yet, no reported cases interpreting new §§811(£)(5) and 1000(c)(5)
of the Internal Revenue Code.
·
89 See Drexler, "The Exclusion Provision of the Gift Tax Law Needs Amending," 29
T.AXEs 743 (1951); Wright, "Gifts to Minor Children," 27 WASH. L. R:&v. 1 (1952);
notes: 27 Nonm DAME LAWYER 97 (1951); 30 N.C.L. R:&v. 94 (1951).
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The Committee Reports which accompanied the introduction of
the present interest requirement explain the reason for that requirement as follows:
"The exemption being available only in so far ·as the donees
are ascertainable, the denial of the exemption in the case of gifts
of future interests is dictated by the apprehended difficulty, in
many instances, of determining the number of eventual donees
and the values of their respective gifts." 90
Admittedly, the problem anticipated by Congress was a real one.
Suppose, for example, a gift in trust providing for the accumulation
of income for ten years and providing further that after the expiration
of ten years the trust estate be distributed equally among the donor's
then living children. In this, and countless similar situations, there is
no way of determining the number of donees, the value of each donee's
gift and, consequently, the number and extent of the allowable exclusions. The resulting evil, absent some statutory corrective, might be
that a donor could obtain several exclusions on what was essentially a
gift to one donee. The future interest prohibition admittedly solves
this problem. It does so, however, by imposing an unnecessarily broad
restriction91 that either confines the trust draftsman to a drafting
straitjacket or lures him to a distortion of the trust device.
The difficulty anticipated by Congress can be satisfactorily met
without the ambiguous and unnecessarily harsh present interest
requirement. It can be met by allowing the exclusion only to the
extent of the minimum value of the interest of a living ascertained
beneficiary, provided that such a minimum value is susceptible of
actuarial determination. Such a modified requirement would avoid
the necessity of speculating as to the number of donees, since that number would be limited to the number of donees who are actually in being and identified at the time of the gift. Similarly, no problem in valuation would exist since, in order to qualify for the exclusion, the gift
would have to have a minimum value that could be actuarially computed. The particular virtue of the suggested "minimum value" test
is that it would give the trust draftsman a degree of flexibility not now
90 H. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st sess. 29 (1932); S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st
sess. 41 (1932). Italics added.
91 See Welch v. Paine, (1st Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 141; Sensenbrenner v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 883; Commissioner v. Glos, (7th Cir. 1941) 123 F.
(2d) 548.

646

MmmGAN LAw R.Evmw

[Vol. 51

available, while at the same time meet the diffic~lty anticipated by
Congress.
The following illustrations will indicate how the minimum value
test would be applied:
I. Suppose a gift in trust which provided that the income be
paid to A for ten years and then the corpus be paid to A if living,
otherwise to B or his estate, and A and B are persons in being at
the time of the gift.
Under the minimum value test, an exclusion would be allowed to the
extent of A's income interest plus A's contingent remainder and an
exclusion would also be allowed to the extent of B's contingent remainder interest. The possibility that neither A nor B might come into the actual possession of the trust corpus is immaterial. It is sufficient, in order to meet the problem anticipated by Congress, that both
A and B are in being at the time of the gift and receive interests in
title (and not necessarily in enjoyment· or possession) which are capable of actuarial valuation. Thus, the value of B's interest would not
be diminished by the possibility that B's estate rather than B might take
the remainder in possession.
2. Suppose the facts are the same as in illustration I, except
that during the term of A's income interest, the trustee has the
discretionary power to invade principal for A's benefit.
The exclusion would be allowed to the extent of A's income interest
( valued without regard to the power to invade principal) plus his contingent remainder, that being the minimum actuarial value of his
interest. Although the power to invade principal for the benefit of A
makes the valuation of his income interest impossible, the valuation
of A's aggregate interest presents no problem under the suggested
minimum value test, since the exercise of the power to invade principal
would increase the value of A's interest in the principal in an amount
more than offsetting the decreased income interest. The minimum
value of A's combined interest in income and principal would remain
the same. No exclusion, however, would be allowed to the extent of
B's contingent remainder interest, since there is no way of actuarially
computing its value.
3. Suppose the facts are the same as in iliustration I, except
that during the term of A's income interest, the trustee has the
discretionary power to invade principal for either or both of A and
B.
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No exclusion whatever would be allowed under the suggested minimum value test because none of the interests thus created can be
actuarially valued. Since, however, the only evil at which the suggested statute is directed is the possibility of obtaining more exclusions
than the number of donees warrants, it would be possible to modify the
minimum value requirement so as to permit an exclusion, or a partial
exclusion, even in this illustration. Thus, the statute might provide
that even though no single interest is created which can be actuarially
valued, where one or more of several living, ascertained persons must
eventually take, one exclusion will be allowed, limited, however, to
the smallest amount by which the donor has not obtained the full
exclusion on gifts to any of such possible beneficiaries during the same
year. For example, in our illustration, if the donor had made other
gifts during the same year totaling $1,000 to A and $2,000 to B, and
such gifts qualified for the exclusion, the donor (if he were unmarried)
would be allowed an exclusion of $1,000 on the hypothetical gift, that
being the smallest amount by which the donor had not obtained a full
exclusion on gifts to either A or B.
4. Suppose a gift in trust which provides that the income be
distributed to A or withheld from him in the trustee's sole discretion, but upon A's attaining 30 years of age, the corpus and any
accumulated income be distributed to him; if A dies before attaining 30 years of age, then to B or his estate. Both A and B are
living at the time of the gift.

An exclusion would be allowed to the extent of the value of A's contingent right to receive the income at age 30 (assuming for this purpose that he will receive none of the income before that age) plus the
value of his contingent remainder interest in th~ corpus; an exclusion
would also be allowed to the extent of B's contingent remainder interest
in the corpus (assuming for the purpose of valuing B's interest, that
all of the income will have been currently distributed to A). Even
though the income might be withheld from A unless and until he
attained 30 years of age, the likelihood of his receiving such income at
age 30, A's minimum income interest, can be actuarially valued. B's
contingent interest in the income, however, cannot be so valued, and,
accordingly, such interest cannot increase the amount of the exclusion
otherwise obtainable on the gift to B.
The above examples indicate that the suggested minimum value
test would permit the trustee of a gift in trust to have considerable dis-
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cretion as to income distributions and principal invasions without
needlessly depriving the donor of the benefits of the gift tax exclusion.
The suggested test does not, however, provide a remedy for the pitfalls which exist in the power to repay indebtedness out of income, the
power to invest in non-productive property, and the forfeiture type
spendthrift clause. The manner in which these latter pitfalls should
be eliminated can be best explained by the following illustrations:
5. Suppose a gift in trust which provides that the income be
paid to A for ten years and then the corpus be paid to A if living,
otherwise to B or his estate and A and B are both living at the time
of the gift. The trust instrument also provides, however, that
the trustee shall have broad powers of investment and reinvestment, including the power to invest in non-productive property.
The exclusions should be allowed as in illustration I, without regard
to the trustee's broad power of investment. There is no convincing
reason for inquiring into the productiveness of the trust corpus. Indeed, expediency alone would dictate that the impossible burden of
speculating as to the existence and amount of future income be
avoided. Since the Gift Tax Regulations presently provide for the
valuation of income and remainder interests on the basis of a hypothetical annuity of three and one-half per cent,92 the statute should
make it clear that such valuation applies without regard to the fact that
the gift property is non-productive or that the trust corpus may in the
future become non-productive.93
6. Suppose the facts are the same as in illustration 5, except
that instead of having a broad power to invest in non-productive
property, the trustee has the power· to borrow and to repay the
resulting indebtedness out of income.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.19.
is recognized that the suggested disregard of the productiveness of the trust corpus
could conceivably result :in a situation where a donor receives two exclusions on what :is
essentially a gift to one donee. For example, suppose a gift of non-productive property in
trust, income to A for ten years and then corpus to B or his estate, and the trust agreement
or extrinsic circumstances indicate that the trust will never be productive. The situation :is
realistically no different from what it would be if there had been no intervening "gift" of
income to A, yet in the illustration two exclusions would be allowed because of the arbi·
trary income factor of three and one-half per cent. It is extremely unlikely, however, that
any donor would postpone the receipt of property by his intended donee or would compel
the maintenance of unproductive property in an unproductive state simply to obtain the
additional gift tax benefits which might result. The practical advantage of having a
workable rule far outweighs the improbable "evil" outlined above.
92

93 It
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This latter power should be treated as the equivalent of a discretionary power in the trustee to distribute or accumulate income. Since the
accumulation of income, rather than its outright distribution, does not
lessen the value of an income interest (provided that the beneficiary
from whom the income was withheld will eventually receive the accumulated income plus the additional income earned on such accumulation), an exclusion would be allowed to the full extent of A's
income and principal interest, discounted only to reflect the possibility
of his death before the expiration of ten years. An exclusion would
also be allowed to the extent of B's contingent remainder interest in
the corpus; as in illustration 4, no value can be placed on B's contingent interest in the income.
7. Suppose the facts are the same as in illustration 5, except
that the trust instrument contains a forfeiture type spendthrift
clause.
The exclusions should be allowed as in illustration 5, without regard
to the spendthrift clause. Although it is true that the operation of the
forfeiture type spendthrift clause would decrease the value of the
interest affected, the statute should expressly make such operation
irrelevant to the exclusion problem. Since the likelihood of the forfeiture type spendthrift clause being invoked is remote, the trustee
having no power to invoke it and the beneficiary's interest being
opposed to its invocation, there is no persuasiye reason for penalizing
the donor for using such clause.
Although the above examples are by no means exhaustive, they
indicate that many of the present restrictions on obtaining the exclusion
can be eliminated, thus making available without gift tax disadvantages
some of the practical advantages of trusteeing gifts, and at the same
time the Treasury position of ~ot giving more than one exclusion on
gifts to one donee can be safeguarded.
SUMMARY AND REcoMMENDATIONS

When Congress added the future interest prohibition to the gift
tax law it undoubtedly did not anticipate the ne~essity of a large volume
of cases to interpret that prohibition. Extensive litigation, however,
has demonstrated the existence of a set of pitfalls, technicalities and
absurdities that are entirely unnecessary to meet the difficulties anticipated by Congress.
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Although the limited Kieckhefer clause may provide an acceptable
drafting remedy in certain instances where the beneficiary is an adult,
its availability for obtaining the exclusion on gifts to minors is still in
doubt. Even if that doubt be eventually resolved in favor of the taxpayer, however, the limited Kieckhefer clause will be far from an ideal
remedy.
The difficulty is one that can be satisfactorily eliminated only by
Congress. The problem that bothered Congress and the Treasury
Department-the difficulty of ascertaining the number of donees and,
consequently, the number and extent of the available exclusionscan be met by allowing the exclusion to the extent of the minimum
actuarial value of the interest of a living, ascertained beneficiary. Such
a requirement, with appropriate refinements, would also accord the
trust draftsman a degree of desirable flexibility not now available.
The one conclusion that is strikingly clear is that it is up to Congress to make the law conform to the dictates of wise trust draftsmanship so long as government fiscal policy is not thereby adversely
affected.

